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Abstract: This note discusses the problems and issues
arising out of the extension of publicity rights to our digital
likenesses-our avatars. It begins, in Part II, by explaining
the scope of an individual's right to publicity. Next, Part III
discusses what it means to have an avatar and whether
publicity rights should extend to a player's avatar. Social
scientists have shown that players in online games become
highly attached to their characters, to the extent that their
online representations become extensions of themselves.
These games also create dynamic societies in which
characters are motivated to interact and work together. As
these virtual communities become larger, more popular, and
more lucrative, the potential for commercial abuses of a
player's digital likeness become very real.
Part IV of this note identifies two potential invasions
of privacy associated with our digital likeness: (i) violations
of the publicity right and (2) mass information gathering
from individual gamers. Finally, Part V of this work
addresses how federal copyright law might preempt the
publicity right in the arena of online gaming.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The publicity right (also known as the "right to likeness") is an
extension of the right to privacy, and is defined as "[t]he right to
control and to choose whether and how to use an individual's identity
for commercial purposes."1 In this note, the statutory right to likeness
is expounded upon in the light of its potential application in the area
of massively multiplayer online role-playing games, or MMORPGs-
games that "allow players to interact with each other and explore a
world in real-time 3-D graphics" while "[e]very player is represented
by a customizable character."2
The issue at the heart of this note is whether players can, now or in
the future, expect to have publicity rights over their avatars. Given
current gaming technology, a publicity right in a player's avatar is
unlikely. However, as technology progresses towards photorealistic
animation, players' publicity rights claims may be strengthened.
Given the strong attachment players have to their avatars and the
dynamic communities that exist in the virtual world, an extension of
publicity rights to avatars can only be a positive development for
online privacy. Avatars not only represent a player's physical presence
in a virtual world, but are also a means of tracking and profiling
individual patterns of socialization, consumption, and entertainment.
As one scholar recently wrote:
These virtual worlds have emerged in the form of
electronic communities or complex online multiplayer
games. These virtual worlds and communities do not
require technology for full body submersion within the
virtual experience; instead, a user can create a fully
three-dimensional person (and radically new virtual
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/10 (2009). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.o1(D)
(West 2009) ("'Right of publicity' means the property right in an individual's persona to
use the individual's persona for a commercial purpose."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-
1103(a) (West 2009) ("Every individual has a property right in the use of that person's
name, photograph, or likeness in any medium in any manner."); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 26.002 (Vernon 2009) ("An individual has a property right in the use of the individual's
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness after the death of the individual.").
ZNick Yee, The Labor of Fun: How Video Games Blur the Boundaries of Work and Play, 1
GAMES & CULTURE 68, 68 (2OO6), available at http://www.nickyee.com/pubs/Yee%2o-
%2obabor%200of%2oFun%2o(2oo6).pdf.
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bodily and personal identity) in the 3D virtual world,
through which he can live, work, and play.3
II. WHAT IS THE PUBLICITY RIGHT?
The right of publicity seeks to protect a person's "name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness" from non-consensual commercial
exploitation.4 The right of publicity should not be confused with
claims brought under the Lanham Act, which protects individuals
against "false endorsement," a claim analogous to the publicity right.5
Some courts distinguish the right of publicity from the tort of
misappropriation in that the former does not focus on the harm to the
plaintiff; rather it focuses on monetary deprivation. 6
Publicity rights were originally protected by common law tort
actions and have since been codified in numerous states' statutes. 7
Generally, the statutes protect a person's likeness when it is "readily
identifiable" 8 and its use is non-incidental.9 Additionally, in order to
3 Jonathon W. Penney, Privacy and the New Virtualism, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 194, 221
(2008).
4 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2009). Some states define the right more broadly: for
example, in Indiana, the publicity right protects personality, and "'personality' means a
living or deceased natural person whose: (1) name; (2) voice; (3) signature; (4)
photograph; (5) image; (6) likeness; (7) distinctive appearance; (8) gesture; or (9)
mannerisms; has commercial value, whether or not the person uses or authorizes the use of
the person's rights of publicity for a commercial purpose during the person's lifetime."
IND. CODE ANN.§ 32-36-1-6 (West 2009).
5 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.; McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., No. 02-198-P-C, 2004 WL 2634465, at
*3 (D. Me. Aug. 19, 2004); Alvarez Guedes v. Marcano-Martinez, 131 F. Supp. 2d 272, 278
(D.P.R. 2001) (noting that right of publicity is not a Lanham Act claim). The purpose of
the Lanham Act is to protect consumers from being misled by a false representation that a
celebrity was sponsoring a product or service. Id.
6 Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:07-0354, 2oo8 WL 472433, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 19,
2oo8). Other courts do not recognize this distinction. Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors
Corp., 85 F.3d 407,413-14 (9th Cir. 1996); Lane v. Random House, 985 F. Supp. 141, 145-
46 (D.D.C. 1995).
7 Right of Publicity Statutes, http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited April 8,
2010).
8 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(b)(1) (West 2009).
9 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(c) (West 2009); see Williams v. Newsweek, Inc., 63 F. Supp.
2d 734, 737-38 (E.D. Va. 1999), affd, 202 F.3d 262 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1279
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violate an individual's right of publicity, the use must be for a
commercial purpose. 10 Consent to use a person's likeness for a
commercial purpose is an affirmative defense to a right of publicity
claim."
In some states, the right of publicity terminates at death. 12 In
many other states, "a right of protection from appropriation of some
element of an individual's personality for commercial exploitation,
[sic] does not terminate upon death."3 Treating the right of publicity
as a property right (of sorts),14 such states find that the publicity right
is "freely transferable, assignable, and licensable, in whole or in
part."15 This means that the right to likeness may be licensed, gifted,
or transferred by will or trust.16 If a person dies without transferring
his or her publicity right, some states regulate how the right will
descend in the person's family.17 Even after transference and
(2000) (finding that the photo of the unidentified "buddy' posing with the author who was
the subject of an article was an incidental use of the "buddy's" likeness).
10 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/5 (West 2009). "'Commercial purpose' means the public
use or holding out of an individual's identity (i) on or in connection with the offering for
sale or sale of a product, merchandise, goods, or services; (ii) for purposes of advertising or
promoting products, merchandise, goods, or services; or (iii) for the purpose of
fundraising." Some courts have found that a plaintiff must show a value in his or her
likeness being associated with the item of commerce in order to prevail. Landhan v. Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2000).
11 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.02(B) (West 2009). A person can also be said to
consent when silent about how he or she wishes his or her likeness to be used. Miller v.
American Sports Co., 237 Neb. 676, 679-80 (Neb. 1991) (finding that a model who did not
restrict the use of her likeness could not complain when photographs of her were used to
imply she was a prostitute).
12 Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579,586 (2d Cir. 199o) (citations omitted);
Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1955).
13 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170(1) (West 2009).
14 In some cases, the publicity right is not recognized as a property right. Hanover Ins. Co.
v. TMP Int'l, Inc., No. 4:04CV668 RWS, 2006 WL 176105, at *2 (E.D. Mo. 20o6) (finding
that the right of publicity is an "intangible property right" and cannot be treated identical
to actual property rights).
15 E.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 63.60.030(1) (West 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-
1103(b) (West 2009).
16E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-16 (West 2009).
17 E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2741.04 (West 2009); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.005(a)
(Vernon 2009).
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alienation, the typical right of publicity statute extinguishes the right a
fixed number of years after a person's death-typically fifty years.18
A person whose right of publicity has been violated may bring an
action in court for actual or statutory damages,19 or "reasonable
royalty."20 Punitive damages may be awarded for willful violations.21
If appropriate, a court may grant injunctive relief in the form of
"temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, [or]
permanent injunctions."22 Many states also authorize the awarding of
reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and expenses to the prevailing
party.23 Several states allow a court to impound materials made in
violation of a person's publicity right,24 and if the plaintiff prevails,
four states allow a court to order the destruction of offending
materials.25 One state even allows the court to order the defendant to
give a public apology or issue a retraction.26 Only four states, though,
have chosen to create a criminal standard parallel to the civil right of
18 E.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/30(b) (West 2009) (50 years); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 391.170(2) (50 years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.02(A) (6o years) (West 2009); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 540.08(5) (West 2009) (40 years). One state terminates the right ten years
after a person's death. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104(b)(2) (West 2009) (1o years). Two
states extend the right for a full hundred years. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-8(a) (West 2009)
(ioo years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448(G) (West 2009).
19 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-10 (West 2009).
20 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(2) (West 2009).
21 E.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/4o(b) (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.Ol-40(A)
(West 2009).
22 E.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936
(1979). Injunctive relief may or may not be appropriate depending on the nature of the
interest the court is protecting, the relative hardship likely to result to the defendant if an
injunction is granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied, the interests of third persons and of
the public, the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment, and several
other factors.
23 E.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/55 (West 2009).
24 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-14(b) (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE § 2741.o7(D)(4); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 63.60.O60(4) (West 2009).
25 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-15() (West 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1106(c) (West
2009); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 63.60.O60(4) (West 2009); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2741.07(E) (West 2009).
26 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-407(4) (West 2009).
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action, though a criminal violation of a person's right of publicity is a
misdemeanor27 in each of the four jurisdictions.28
Many legislatures have chosen to immunize media conduits who
innocently publish solicitations or advertisements in violation of an
individual's right of publicity, including "newspapers, magazines,
radio and television networks and stations, cable television systems,
billboards, and transit ads."29 In order to benefit from this immunity,
however, these companies must have unknowingly violated a person's
publicity right.3o
States have generally recognized that protecting the right of
publicity naturally implicates First Amendment rights to free speech
and expression. Accordingly, many statutes limit the scope of the
publicity right by recognizing certain expressive exemptions.31 The
first exemption allows the use of an individual's likeness "in
connection with the broadcast or reporting of an event or topic of
general or public interest."32 While the news outlets are not given
27 A misdemeanor is "[a] crime that is less serious than a felony and is usu[ally] punishable
by fine, penalty, forfeiture, or confinement (usu[ally] for a brief term) in a place other than
prison (such as a county jail)." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1089 (9th ed. 2004).
28 N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS § 50 (West 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1105(b) (West 2009)
(class A misdemeanor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-407(2) (West 2009) (class B
misdemeanor); VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-216.1 (West 2009) (misdemeanor with minimum
fine of $5o, maximum of $1,ooo).
29 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(f) (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448(L) (West 2009).
30 Id.; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316(d) (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.02(E)
(West 2009); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.810(2) (West 2009); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 26.012(C) (Vernon 2009); see also WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 63.60.070(4) (West 2009)
(media conduit cannot be liable for violation of publicity right in advertising "unless the
advertisement or solicitation was intended to promote the medium itself.").
31 Some states take a more belt-and-suspenders approach to the Constitutional problem.
E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2741.o9(B) (West 2009) (declaring that the right of publicity
"does not affect rights or privileges recognized under the Ohio Constitution or United
States Constitution."); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2741.o9(A)(6) (West 2009); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 995.50(3) (West 2009) ("The right of privacy recognized in this section shall be
interpreted in accordance with the developing common law of privacy, including defenses
of absolute and qualified privilege, with due regard for maintaining freedom of
communication, privately and through the public media.").
32 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2741.09(A)(3) (West 2009); see also NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-
202(1) (2009). The news exception permits use of an individual's likeness when reporting
on matters of "public interest," unless there is no relationship between the likeness and the
"news" is really an advertisement. Messenger v. Gruner and Jahr Printing and Publ'g, 208
F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 818 (2000).
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First Amendment immunity from tort liability under Branzburg v.
Hayes, most states exempt news outlets from liability for breaching
the right of publicity.33 Even though the First Amendment does not
require states to immunize news outlets under Branzburg, there is a
strong public interest in creating such an exemption - namely for the
news media to furnish access to information so that the public might
sift through and find the truth.34 This is not something states wish to
stifle. Similarly, some states exempt political campaigns from liability
for violating the right of publicity.35
33 408 U.S. 665, 682-83 (1972). See also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70
(1991) (finding that newspapers can be made subject to tort laws of general applicability).
For a discussion of the First Amendment right to gather information, see Barry P.
McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards A Realistic
Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249 (2004).
34 Robert Schmuhl and Robert G. Picard, The Marketplace of Ideas, in THE INSTTUTIONS
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE PRESS 141, 146-47 (Geneva Overholser and Kathleen Hall
Jamieson, eds., 2006); Abrams v. U. S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate
is the theory of our Constitution.").
-1 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.02(D)(2) (West 2009); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(d)
(West 2009); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/35(b)(2) (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1449(D).
The protection of political speech is at the core of the First Amendment, and the
Supreme Court has often afforded it the highest protection. E.g., McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,347-48 (1995). There are a plethora of other exceptions
to the publicity right that are not relevant here. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597-790(3) (West
2009) (exception for government agency); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS § 51 (exception for licensing of
sound recording); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2741.o9(A)(5) (West 2009) (higher education
exception); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 63.60.070(6) (West 2009) (de minimis exception);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 597.790(2)(g) (West 2009) (promotion of state tourism exception);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449(C) (West 2009) (employment exception); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-25-1107(a) (West 2009) (fair use exception); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A
(West 2009) (author or composer identification exception); Christianson v. Henry Holt
and Co., LLC, No. o6-cv-1156, 2007 WL 2680822, at *2-3 (C.D. Ill. June 29, 2007)
(attempt to claim "fine art" exception); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 968-69 (loth Cir. 1996) (parody cards do not infringe on players'
publicity rights).
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III. AVATARS & PUBLICITY RIGHTS: WHY SHOULD WE CARE?
At the heart of this note is whether, under the current legal
environment, a player can expect to own the right of publicity in his or
her MMORPG characters or avatars. In addressing this issue, the
question of whether players should have publicity rights in their
avatars also arises.
A. Do PLAYERS HAVE PUBLICITY RIGHTS IN THEIR
AVATARS AND CHARACTERS?
As a practical matter, players do not have publicity rights in their
avatars or characters. This issue has not been decided by courts or
legislatures, but rather by the game makers such as Blizzard (the
makers of World of Warcraft) or Linden Labs (the makers of Second
Life). In order to play any of the major MMORPGs, players must
waive any rights they have in their characters. For example, in order
to create an account and play World of Warcraft, players are subject
to "clickthrough" or "clickwrap" agreements3 6 such as terms of service
("TOS") and end-user license agreements ("EULA"). Blizzard's World
of Warcraft agreement requires players to concede that "[a]ll title,
ownership rights and intellectual property rights in and to the Game
and all copies thereof (including without limitation any.., characters,
character names, . . . character inventories, . . . character likenesses,
... moral rights... ) are owned or licensed by Blizzard."37 Each game
36 A "clickthrough" or "clickwrap" agreement is a "kind of online software license
agreement" that "presents the user with a message on his or her computer screen,
requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the terms of the license agreement by
clicking on an icon. The product cannot be obtained or used unless and until the icon is
clicked." Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 3o6 F.3d 17, 22 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2002).
37 World of Warcraft End-User License Agreement, part 4A - Ownership,
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/eula.html (last visited April 8, 2010). Similarly, in
order to play Age of Conan (a game similar to World of Warcraft), players must agree that
all right, title, interest, license and intellectual and other property rights in and to the
Game and all copies or other reproductions thereof (including, without limitation....
characters, character names, stories, dialog, catch phrases, ... character .... character
likenesses,.. .) are exclusively owned or licensed by Funcom ... This Agreement grants
You no rights to use such content... You may not transfer or otherwise assign all or any
portion of your rights, duties or obligations under this Agreement to any person.
Age of Conan End-User License Agreement, part 3 - Intellectual Property Rights,
http://support.ageofconan.com/article.php?id=171 (last visited April 8, 2010); see also
The Sims 3 End-User License Agreement, part 2A, http://www.simprograms.com/the-
sims-3-eula-for-retail-game (last visited April 8, 2010).
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service will have different terms based on the services it offers, but the
clickthrough agreements are largely similar to one another.38
Clickthrough agreements are not always enforceable because they
are contracts of adhesion, which are sometimes considered too
unconscionable to enforce.39 In order for these agreements to be
unenforceable, they must be both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability occurs where there is
impropriety during contract formation; substantive unconscionability
occurs where a part of the contract is one-sided or overly harsh.4o If
any part of the contract is unconscionable, a court may (1) refuse to
enforce the contract in its entirety, (2) enforce the contract less the
unconscionable terms, or (3) limit the application of a term as to avoid
an unconscionable result.41 The judge will determine whether all or
38 For example in Second Life, the game seeks to foster a more creative environment than
fantasy adventure games such as World of Warcraft. Second Life, The Creations,
http://secondlife.com/whatis/creations.php (last visited April 8, 20o). In order to do
this, the Second Life terms of service allow players to retain certain intellectual property
rights over the content they create in-game. Second Life Terms of Service, part 3.2,
http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited April 8, 2010) ("you will retain any
and all applicable copyright and other intellectual property rights with respect to any
Content you create using the Service"). However, this is subject to the fact that Linden
Lab, the creators of Second Life, owns user accounts: "[y]ou agree that even though you
may retain certain copyright or other intellectual property rights with respect to Content
you create while using the Service, you do not own the account you use to access the
Service, nor do you own any data Linden Lab stores on Linden Lab servers (including
without limitation any data representing or embodying any or all of your Content). Your
intellectual property rights do not confer any rights of access to the Service or any rights to
data stored by or on behalf of Linden Lab." Id. at 3.3. Further, -you agree to grant to
Linden Lab a royalty-free, worldwide, fully paid-up, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive,
sublicensable right and license to exercise the copyright, publicity, and database rights you
have in your account information, including any data or other information generated by
your account activity, in any media now known or not currently known." Id. (emphasis
added).
39 "A contract or clause is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion. A
contract of adhesion, in turn, is a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the
party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it. Under California law, the critical factor in
procedural unconscionability analysis is the manner in which the contract or the disputed
clause was presented and negotiated. When the weaker party is presented the clause and
told to 'take it or leave it' without the opportunity for meaningful negotiation, oppression,
and therefore procedural unconscionability, are present." Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc.,
487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605-6o6 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
40 In re RealNetworks, Privacy Litig., 2000 WL 631341, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: Unconscionable Contract or Term § 208 (1981).
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any part of a clickthrough agreement is unconscionable in light of all
the material facts,42 including the setting, purpose, and effect of the
contract.43 It is only by looking at the totality of the circumstances that
clickthrough agreements can be deemed unconscionable and therefore
unenforceable.44
For example, in Bragg v. Linden Research, a player sued Linden
Labs-the company that operates Second Life-over a virtual property
transaction.45 Linden sought to enforce a mandatory arbitration
clause in its terms of service.46 The court found the mandatory
arbitration clause unconscionable for six reasons: (1) the TOS gave
Linden absolute power to terminate the players' accounts without
notice or showing of cause; (2) the TOS were unduly one-sided, giving
Linden the right to unilaterally modify the terms without notice; (3)
the clause forced the parties to share the cost of arbitration, which was
estimated to be $17,250; (4) the arbitration would take place in San
Francisco, far from the plaintiffs residence in Pennsylvania; (5) the
arbitration proceedings were to be confidential under the TOS; and
(6) Linden could not justify the one-sidedness of the TOS.47 Under the
totality of these circumstances, the mandatory arbitration clause was
found to be unconscionable, and therefore, unenforceable.
As no court has yet decided the issue, it is not clear whether a
clause forcing a player to waive his or her publicity right could be
deemed unconscionable and unenforceable. It is clear, however, that
the hardship and damages caused by commercial use of a player's
avatar are unlikely to approach the magnitude of the six
42 Id. at § 208 cmt. f.
43 Id. at § 208 cmt. a.
44 Under the common law, avoidance of a contract due to unconscionability requires a
showing of "gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably
favorable to the stronger party". Id. at § 2o8 cmt. d (citations omitted).
45 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 597.
46 Id.; An arbitration clause is "[a] contractual provision mandating arbitration-and
thereby avoiding litigation-of disputes about the contracting parties' rights, duties, and
liabilities." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 120 (9 th ed. 2009). In the current Second Life TOS,
the arbitration provision is optional, not mandatory-a change that is likely the result of
the Bragg case. Second Life Terms of Service, part 7.3,
http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited April 8, 2010).
47 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 6o8-611.
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circumstances cited by the Bragg court.48 If it is assumed that that a
waiver to the likeness of one's avatar is likely enforceable, and that
"the focus of any right of publicity analysis must always be on the
actor's own persona and not of the character's,"49 any potential abuse
of an avatar by game makers would not be analogous to commercial
abuse of an individual's publicity right. However, these assumptions
are undercut by psychological and social science studies surrounding
online gaming.
B. SHOULD PLAYERS HAVE PUBLICITY RIGHTS IN THEIR
AVATARS, Now OR IN THE FUTURE?
As gaming technology advances, a right to the likeness of a player's
digital self becomes more viable. An estimated 30 to 45 million
people participate in virtual worlds such as Second Life, World of
Warcraft, and Everquest, with more joining each day.so The typical
player will devote hundreds of hours and a substantial amount of
money to develop his or her avatar.5 1 Recent advances in graphics and
sound technology have allowed creators to "render whole
environments almost as richly detailed and animated as reality
itself."52 The primary reason, however, that more and more people are
spending time inside these virtual worlds is simple - it's fun.53 All fun
aside, in analyzing MMORPGs, two facets of these worlds are
48 The damages associated with use of one's avatar would be purely monetary (e.g.,
royalties), and, at worst, damage the player's in-game reputation. There is also an
inconvenience associated with filing a lawsuit, but this inconvenience is associated with an
assertion of any right.
49 Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1221 (loth Cir. 2004) (citing Landham,
227 F.3d 619).
5 0 EDWARD CASTRONOVA, EXODUS TO THE VIRTUAL WORLD: How ONLINE FUN IS CHANGING
REALIY 18 (2007).
s" Florence Chee et al., Online Gaming and the Interactional Self, in GAMING AS CULTURE:
ESSAYS ON REALITY, IDENTITY AND EXPERIENCE IN FANTASY GAMES 154, 164 (J. Patrick
Williams et al. eds., 2006) (citing Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand
Account of Market and Society on the Cyberian Frontier,
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=loo8&context=giwp).
52 Castronova, supra note 50, at 26.
53 Id. at 15. As Castronova points out, not only are these worlds fun, they are designed to
be more fun than the real world. Id. at 15-17.
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important in considering the publicity right: (i) the relationship
between the player and the player's virtual representation, and (2) the
virtual communities these worlds foster.
1. CHARACTERS AND AVATARS As MEDIATORS, As SELVES
To interact with the virtual world, players create online
representations. There are two ways a player can create these
representations: (1) as an extension of the player's self, i.e., as an
avatar, or (2) as a character, i.e., a representation separate from the
player's real world identity.54 While some games advertise the
character creation process as creating an extension of the self,55
fantasy games such as World of Warcraft merely allow players to
create archetypal characters.
For players, both characters and avatars "are vehicles onto which
they project their own goals, skills, experiences[,] and understanding
of the game."56 It is a vital part of the MMORPGs experience that
player are able to interact with the virtual world "as an embodied
representation of themselves."57 In creating avatars and characters,
psychology research shows that players attempt to create an accurate
representation of themselves, or their ideal selves,58 and that players
54 Ragnhild Tronstad, Character Identification in World of Warcraft: The Relationship
between Capacity and Appearance, in DIGITAL CULTURE, PLAY, AND IDENTITY: A WORLD
OF WARCRAFT READER 248, 251 (Hilde G. Corneliussen and Jill W. Rettberg eds., 2008).
The player considers the character a separate entity, different from the player, while the
avatar is considered an extension of the self. Id.; see also id. at 258 ("In Indian mythology,
the avatar is a god's representation on Earth; thus it seems reasonable to reserve the term
for player-character relationships in which the character functions as a representative of
the player in the game.").
55 See Posting of Medievaldragon to http://www.blizzplanet.com/blog/comments/verne-
troyer---world-of-warcraft-tv-commercial (Dec. 27, 2007, i:o6 PM) (Verne Troyer
commercial for WoW); Posting of Medievadragon to
http://www.blizzplanet.com/blog/comments/mr.-t-and-shatner---wow-commercials
(Nov. 20, 2007, 3:03 PM) (Mr. T and William Shatner commercials for WoW).
56 Jan Simons, Narrative, Games, and Theory, Intl J. of Computer Game Research
(2007), available at http://gamestudies.org/o7o/articles/simons.
57 Katherine Bessiere et al., The Ideal Elf. Identity Exploration in World of Warcraft, l0
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIOR 530 , 530 (2007).
58 Id. at 530-31 ("online environments offer people the option of creating multiple
representations of themselves and exploring new aspects of themselves ... the
representations people make of themselves online are an amalgamation of their actual and
ideal selves-that is, that the virtual self is a somewhat idealized actual self").
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rely heavily on "real world personalities and experiences to construct"
their online representations.9 Additionally, avatars are often role-
played
in ways that [are] closely related to [players'] real-
world identities . . this identification common in
[MMORPG]s actually blurs the distinction between
user and avatar: 'Interaction with and immersion in
the game affords users the narcissistic satisfaction of
relating to a technological second self. [The avatar
becomes] an extension of the play and the separateness
of the avatar's body is obliterated.' 60
MMORPGs attempt to connect the player with the avatar to create a
seamless experience where the difference between reality and
virtuality is non-existent. 61 The law protects an individual's likeness
from commercial abuse not only because it has value, but because it is
a part of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy that he or
she should control his or her own identity and persona. The fact that
MMORPGs foster such strong attachments between players and their
avatars is a compelling reason to allow a player a similar semblance of
control over his or her avatar that is afforded to his or her self through
59 Zachary C. Waggoner, Passage to Morrowind: (Dis)locating Virtual and "Real" Identities
in Video Role-Playing Games 155 (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Arizona
State University) (available via ProQuest); Asimina Vasalou et al., Avatars in social media:
Balancing accuracy, playfulness and embodied messages, 66 INT'L J. OF HUMAN-
COMPUTER STUDIES 8oi, 8o8 (2OO8) ("avatars' physical characteristics were chosen
carefully to reflect their owners' appearance.").
6o Waggoner, supra note 59, at 161. It is this ability to play as the self that separates
MMORPGs from other character-driven media. Melissa L. Lewis et al., "They May Be
Pixels, But They're MY Pixels:" Developing a Metric of Character Attachment in Role-
Playing Video Games, 11 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIOR 515, 515 (2008). Character
attachment manifests in five different ways "as an individual's feelings of (a) friendship
and (b) identification with a video game character when an individual (c) is willing to
suspend disbelief, (d) feels responsible for the game character, and (e) feels in control of
the game character's actions." Id. at 516.
61 Ideally, "[t]he player and the character are [] perfectly connected, which requires that the
player has internalized the controls and game mechanics to such a degree that the medium
between himself and the gameworld becomes transparent." Tronstad, supra note 54, at
254. In this state, the player will lose self-consciousness and self-reflection. Id. In this
state, the avatar appears to the character as a "moment of ephemeral, sensuous presence."
Id. Of course, MMORPGs do not always play in this state; many activities are tedious (such
as leveling and gathering materials). Id. at 255.
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the publicity right. At the very least, it is a compelling reason to find
that a waiver of the publicity right over one's avatar in a contract of
adhesion is substantively unconscionable.
Publicity rights have been extended to numerous media-from
film to photo to audio. In theory, one should be able to protect one's
likeness regardless of the medium. In many games, however, players
create characters that do not look remotely like themselves. 62 Even in
MMORPGs where players can create avatars in their own image, such
as Second Life, they often fail to create a likeness of themselves. 63
Animation technology has a long way to go before avatars truly begin
to resemble their players. Until this happens, extension of the
publicity right to avatars could only be justified on psychological
grounds- i.e., that players consider these representations to be a part
of themselves. While there is a certain appeal to this reasoning, it
seems to be an unlikely ground upon which courts or legislatures will
advance privacy jurisprudence.
2. THE MMORPG VIRTUAL COMMUNITY
Notions of community are concepts that exist only in the mind;
theorists have posited that all communities are virtual to a certain
extent.64 MMORPGs offer communities and interactions similar to
the real world: they provide work for players, allow groups to form
and interact, and often sustain a dynamic in-game economy.65
MMORPGs offer players the opportunity to work, communicate,
interact, and change the virtual worlds around them; avatars act as
"extensions" of the self, allowing a person to pursue "prestige,
acquisitions, social standing, friendship, camaraderie, connection[,]
62 World of Warcraft is one such game. There are a limited number of characters a person
could play, with a limited range of physical appearances.
63 Current graphics technology is incapable of creating an exact, photo-realistic likeness of
a person. The harder animators seem to try, the worse the likeness seems to become. The
problem is one of the "uncanny valley" - as avatars look more human, their non-human
qualities begin to stand out, and the avatar quickly looses appeal. Daniel Floyd, Video
Games and the Uncanny Valley, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKTAJBQSmio (last
visited April 8, 2010). There are many games that attempt to approach realistic looking
avatars, e.g., Tiger Woods PGA Tour 2o09 All-Play for the Nintendo Wii, that simply end
up looking creepy and off-putting.
64 Chee et al., supra note 51 at 160.
65 Id. at 161.
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and community" online. 66 These motivations are acts of community
and can lead to addict-like behavior, behavior that is fed by the sense
of community and commitment that long-hours of game play foster.67
As one study suggests, playing such games "holds deeply meaningful
and shared experiences that are rooted in community values and
reciprocal projects."68
Thus, MMORPGs not only offer players a sense of self, but provide
them with a sense of community as well. This communal concept is
important in that it reminds us that virtual worlds offer structure and
content that is similar or superior to that of the real world. The
difference between the virtual and real worlds is that the virtual
worlds are owned and operated entirely by for-profit corporations.
With an increasingly larger proportion of people spending long hours
inside virtual worlds, the game design decisions made by Linden Labs
and Blizzard are equivalent to public policy decisions. "This is
because, structurally, [game design and public policy design] are the
same. They both involve assessing the interests of large numbers of
otherwise unassociated people, and then determining the best course
of action for the authorities." 69 While public policy seeks to maximize
prosperity and a host of other legitimate concerns, game design seeks
to maximize fun, and thereby profit.7o Policy makers, however, are
accountable for their abuses; the most a player can do to an abusive
game designer is to have fun elsewhere.
IV. POTENTIAL INVASIONS OF PRIVACY RELATED TO AVATARS:
VIOLATIONS OF THE PUBLICITY RIGHT & THE DANGERS OF
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING
Commercial abuse of a person's likeness can take many forms,
including use in advertising. However, one difference between regular
advertising and advertising on the internet is the potential for
interactivity; whereas traditional advertising is a one-way medium,
the internet allows for two-way communication such that the
66 Id. at 165.
67 Id. at 168.
68 Id.
69 Castronova, supra note 50, at xvii. See generally id. at 109-133.
70 Id. at 111.
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consumer is engaged in the message. 71 Internet advertising also has
the capacity to be highly personalized- in fact, the ability of a user to
customize his or her internet experience affords advertisers an
unprecedented ability to develop a consumer profile of that user.72
Social networking website users are familiar with the potential of
internet advertising. Many users of Facebook have protested that
site's movements towards intrusive advertising models such as
advertisements that use a person's profile pictures in order to
advertise products and services to that person's friends.73
MMORPGs present a similar potential for abuse to that of social
networking. For example, Second Life has a vibrant in-game economy
that is driven by players creating digital goods for consumption. This
type of market mimics the real world market in that vendors are
incentivized to have their products associated with certain people.
Thus, in Second Life, it is possible for players to advertise their own
products and use the likeness of another player's avatar in doing so.
Similarly, the game makers may use an avatar to advertise the game
itself. This use of the avatars seems rather innocuous on the surface;
however, given the enormous amount of wealth that these games
generate, these are precisely the kind of uses that the publicity right
was meant to protect against. However, as noted above, the publicity
right would likely only extend to avatars if technology allowed for a
photorealistic representation of the player.74
71 Sally J. McMillan, Internet Advertising: One Face or Many?, in INTERNET ADVERTISING:
THEORY AND RESEARCH 2ND ED. 15, 17 (David W. Schumann & Esther Thorson eds., 2 nd ed.,
2007).
72 Id. at 18.
73 Megan McCarthy, Facebook Ads Make You the Star - And You May Not Know It,
WIRED, Jan. 2, 2008, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2oo8/ol/facebook-ads-ma;
Meghan Keane, Facebook's New Social Ads Turn Your Friends Into Marketers, WIRED,
Aug. 20, 20o8, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2oo8/o8/your-facebook-n; Lee
Mathews, Facebook sez, "Don't mind us, we're just whoring out your photos",
DOWNLOADSSQUAD.COM, Jul. 16, 2009,
http://www.downloadsquad.com/2oo9/o7/16/facebook-sez-dont-mind-us-were-just-
whoring-out-your-photos.
74 Applying the publicity rights to avatars is similar to applying publicity rights to the digital
representation of an actor. Erin Giacoppo, Note, Avoiding the Tragedy of Frankenstein:
The Application of the Right of Publicity to the Use of Digitally Reproduced Actors in
Film, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 6ol, 6o7-1o, 618-20 (1997). The difference is, of course, that a
wizard that looks like its player is not worth nearly as much as, say, Tom Hanks' likeness in
The Polar Express. See THE POLAR ExPREss (Castle Rock Entertainment 2004).
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The potential intrusiveness exposes players and users not only to
misappropriation of their likenesses, but also, unsettlingly, allows
information to be gathered regarding all of a person's virtual
movements. It is unsettling because "the borders between cyberspace
and real space are not clearly defined. They are porous, flexible, fluid,
and shifting."75 Our personhood in cyberspace is more easily
connected with private information that might otherwise remain
disparate and scattered.76 As advertising shifts online and becomes
more targeted, it is likely that avatars could become not only mediums
of advertising,7 but also a means of gathering consumer profiles. This
is especially true given the large amounts of time people are spending
in avatar form78 and the rate at which technology is advancing.79
Given the fun virtual worlds offer, it is possible to envision virtual
worlds set up not as games but as universities, offices, or shopping
malls. It flies in the face of notions of privacy that participation in the
virtual world is contingent on information being gathered about a
user, and that users will have no control over how their virtual
likeness may be used.8o One of the primary benefits of the virtual
75 Penney, supra note 3, at 198.
76 Id. ("Where we have physical bodies separate from the information recorded about us,
personhood in cyberspace is more intimately connected to this information. If privacy sets
out to protect the interests of the virtual person in cyberspace, then privacy in this data and
information becomes essential ... our *virtual person' is an important extension of our own
person and identity, with implications for intimacy and dignity.").
77 See, e.g., Josh Quittner, RIP Facebook?, CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 4, 2007,
http://techland.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2007/12/04/rip-facebook ("Beacon social ads
scheme that tracks people's web-surfing habits even when they're not on the site").
78 The average intensity of playing MMORPGs is 22.7 hours per week, with about 9% of
players spending more than 40 hours a week. Over 6o% of players also confirmed that
they sometimes spend over lo hours at a time." David Smahel et al., Playing MMORPGs:
Connections between Addiction and Identifying with a Character, 11 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY &
BEHAVIOR 715, 715 (2OO8).
79 "[I]t is quite conceivable that in a few years avatars whose behavior is nearly
imperceptible from humans' will be available." Judith Donath, Virtually Trustworthy, 317
SCIENCE 53 (2007).
8o As was stated in the seminal article on the right to privacy, "The common law secures to
each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others. Under our system of
government, he can never be compelled to express them (except when upon the witness
stand); and even if he has chosen to give them expression, he generally retains the power to
fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given them. The existence of this right does not
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world is that it is accessible from almost anywhere. Such worlds also
allow us to be connected to people and places in ways that would
otherwise be impossible. These benefits also allow for behavioral
advertising practices - i.e., using a person's online habits to determine
his or her interests.81 While most internet companies are allowed to
collect this information, this practice is beginning to be regulated and
litigated in the U.S. and E.U.82 The average web surfer has a
reasonable expectation of privacy that he or she will not be tracked
while surfing,8 3 and this expectation is no different for online gamers.
Indeed, MMORPGs give even greater insight into an individual's mind
than regular surfing;8 4 players use their avatars to shop, socialize,
fight, love, imagine, and travel. Such exposure warrants a greater
degree of protection for players and their avatars.
Given the potential for harm here, additional legal protection is
warranted for a person's avatar. In the United States, a great deal of
private information is protected using an opt-in or opt-out system.
"An opt-in provision, [sic] means the web site will not use the
information unless the consumer specifically says it is permissible to
do so. An opt-out provision means the web site can use the
information collected unless the consumer specifically directs the site
no [sic] to do so."85 For example, the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003
regulates how commercial entities in the United States can send spam
email by giving the recipients the right to opt-out of future emails. 86
depend upon the particular method of expression adopted." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 198 (1890).
81 Matthew Bender et al., 1-2A Computer Law § 2A.20 (2009); James Schedwin, Online
and Locational Privacy, 4 ISJLP 709, 710 (2009).
82 Bender, supra note 81; see also Melkonian v. Facebook, Inc., No. 30-2009, complaint
filed Aug. 17, 2009 (Cal.) (alleging, inter alia, misappropriation of name and likeness).
83 Andrew Hotaling, Protecting Personally Identifiable Information on the Internet:
Notice and Consent in the Age of Behavioral Targeting, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 529,
549 (20o8). See also Heather 0. Ng, Targeting Bad Behavior: Why Federal Regulators
Must Treat Online Behavioral Marketing as Spyware, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
369, 375-82 (2009) (explaining the harms of behavioral advertising).
' See Ng, supra note 83, at 378.
85 R. Ken Pippin, Consumer Privacy on the Internet: It's "Surfer Beware", 47 A.F.L. REV.
125, 132 (1999).
86 The CAN-SPAM Act: A Compliance Guide for Business,




Similarly, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act regulates the financial
industry and requires that such companies give consumers the ability
to opt-out of having private information shared with third parties.8 7
Applying this principle to MMORPGs would, at the very least, serve
two functions: first, it would put players on notice of any information
that is being collected; and, second, it would allow players to weigh
the privacy costs of playing an MMORPG against the game's benefit in
order to make an informed choice. While, opt-out/opt-in laws are the
most lenient and industry-friendly form of privacy protection, they are
also provide consumers with a minimal level of protection.
V. COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION OF THE PUBLICITY RIGHT
The following sections give an overview of copyright law, federal
preemption of state law, and the copyright preemption statute.
Finally, this section seeks to discover how copyright law might
preempt the publicity right.
A. COPYRIGHT AND PREEMPTION
Intellectual property rights are a reward for an act of creation,
unlike traditional property rights, which are associated with unique
lands or items. Intellectual property owners are given a monopoly
over the market for their creations.88 The Copyright Clause of the
United States Constitution gives Congress the mandate "[t]o promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries."8 9 Copyright is more than a literal right to copy, as
87 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b).
88 "[Intellectual property] protection is thus meant to encourage persons to become more
productive by allowing them to capture some of the benefits of their useful behaviour [sic].
It involves however a trade-off between the granted author's limited monopoly and the
need of the society as a whole to make use of the author's creativity and innovation." Mira
B. Nenova, New Technologies and the Protection and Promotion of Traditional Cultural
Expressions, at 4 (May 2007);
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=io9o824. Thus, what intellectual
property law seeks to reward is not the creation of property, but rather the creative act.
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. "The legislative history of the Copyright Act describes several
other objectives: 1) to promote national uniformity and avoid the difficulties of
determining and enforcing rights under different state laws; 2) to have copyright
protection last for a limited time period, so that scholars and the public can benefit from
the dissemination of copyrighted materials; and 3) to improve our international dealings in
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the name might imply. A work is afforded copyright when it is (1)
sufficiently original and (2) fixed in a tangible form.9o A copyright
gives an author the right to do (and in turn prevent others from doing)
six things: to reproduce the work; to prepare derivative works;91 to
distribute the work; to perform the work; to display the work; and to
perform the work by means of digital audio transmission.92 These six
rights are the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright
that will be discussed below.
In certain cases, the federal government can take over an area of
law and prevent the states from legislating in that area. This is the
concept of preemption.93 In the case of federal copyright law,
preemption is expressly set out in the copyright statute. The copyright
preemption statute prevents competing state systems of copyright
copyrighted materials." Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 66o (5th Cir. 2000) (citing H. R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 129-30 (1976)).
go 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (LexisNexis 2009) holds that "Copyright protection subsists, in
accordance with this title, in original works of authorshipfixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."
(emphasis added).
9 A "derivative work" is defined as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works." 17
U.S.C. § lOl (West 2009).
92 17 U.S.C. §106(1) through (6) (West 2009).
93 The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution permits federal law to preempt
or supersede conflicting state law, providing that "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 [sic]. Thus, "state laws that conflict with
federal law are without effect." Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008)
(citations and internal quotation marks removed). However, "there is a presumption
against the supplanting of historic state police powers by the federal government unless
preemption is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Tyrrell v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
248 F.3d 517,522 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).
Given this presumption, federal law will preempt state law only "where (1) a federal
statute expressly preempts state law, (2) a federal law impliedly preempts state law, or (3)
federal law and state law actually conflict." Gibson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 943,
948-49 (6th Cir. 2002). Under the latter standard, the courts will not construe state and
federal law to be in conflict unless compliance with both is physically impossible, or if the
state law is an obstacle to realizing the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Id. at 949
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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law;94 the statute preempts state laws that purport to give rights that
are equivalent to the aforementioned six exclusive rights of copyright,
and that come within the subject matter of copyright.95 There are
eight types of work that come within the subject matter of copyright:
"(1) literary works; (2) musical works... ; (3) dramatic works... ; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7)
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works."96 Copyright only
protects works in these subjects where they are sufficiently original97
and fixed in a tangible medium of expression.98 A state law cannot
award rights in these eight subject matters to works that are fixed and
original without running afoul of federal copyright law.
" Under the prior statutory scheme, state systems of copyright law might have been
possible. This possibility was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546,553 (1973). However, the current copyright scheme disallows any
state copyrights acts from regulating concurrent with the Copyright Act of 1976. Melville
B. Nimmer, 1-1 Nimmer on Copyright § i.oi[A] (rev. ed. 2009).
9517 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Lexis Nexis 2006). A state law will not be considered equivalent if
the state law carries elements in addition to copyright elements. Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d. Cir. 1983) ("[W]hen a state law
violation is predicated upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere reproduction or
the like, the rights involved are not equivalent and preemption will not occur."); Toney v.
L'Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 91o (7th Cir. 2005) ("to avoid preemption, a state law
must regulate conduct that is qualitatively distinguishable from that governed by federal
copyright law-i.e., conduct other than reproduction, adaptation, publication,
performance, and display.").
96 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (LexisNexis 2009) (punctuation changed). In addition, compilations
and derivative works are within the subject matter of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 103
(LexisNexis 2009).
9717 U.S.C. § 102(a) (LexisNexis 2009); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340,363 (1991) ("As a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent
elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity.").
98 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (LexisNexis 2009); "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of
expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(definitions); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic International, Inc., 704 F.2d loo9, 1012 (7th Cir.
1983) (finding video games to be fixed).
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B. COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION OF THE PUBLICITY RIGHT
Many courts consider it a given that the right of publicity is not
preempted by copyright law.99 However, in certain circumstances,
copyright law can preempt the right of publicity. This occurs when an
individual's publicity rights claim is "intimately interlocked with a
claim for reproduction of a copyrightable work."10°  Whether the
publicity right is preempted is entirely based on how a court chooses
to conceptualize the right. The test mentioned above requires
preemption of rights that are equivalent, covering the same subject
matter of copyright. In large part, the courts will preempt the publicity
right when the facts presented indicate that the plaintiff is not
attempting to protect his or her likeness, but rather attempting to
prevent the exercise of an otherwise valid copyright. For example, in
Stanford v. Caesars Entertainment, Inc., an actor who portrayed a
character named Loose Slot Louie in a casino advertising campaign
sued the casinos, arguing that the advertisements violated his
publicity rights. 1°1 The court disagreed. The basis of the court's
decision was that Stanford was attempting to interfere with an
otherwise-valid exercise of copyright.1°2
The arguments for and against preemption will be discussed for
equivalency and then subject matter. The section concludes with a
discussion of fixation and the relevant legislative history of the
Copyright Act of 1976.
1. IS THE PUBLICITY RIGHT EQUIALENT TO COPYRIGHT?
The argument that the publicity right is not equivalent to
copyright (and therefore is not preempted by it) is as follows. The sole
purpose of the publicity right is to "allow a person to control the
99 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 867 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("Plaintiffs
own likeness and name cannot seriously be argued to constitute a *work of authorship'
within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 102. Thus, copyright preemption does not apply.").
10 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 11:49 (2d ed. 2000).
101 Stanford v. Caesars Entertainment, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 749, 751 (2006).
102 See id. at 756-57 ("The fact that Plaintiff is disputing Defendants' use of his image, not
as Crisper Stanford, but as Crisper Stanford playing "Loose Slot Louie," makes his case
unlike those in which courts have found that federal copyright law does not preempt a
state-law right of publicity.").
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commercial value of his or her identity."1° 3 Therefore, a violation of
the publicity right requires a showing of a commercial purpose, which
a copyright infringement does not require.14 This indicates that the
rights are in fact separate, and that consenting to one is not the same
as consenting to both.1°5 The argument continues, "[i]dentity ... is an
amorphous concept that is not protected by copyright law; thus, the
state law protecting it is not preempted."10 6 Copyright arises only out
of an act of authorship. Likeness is not the product of original
authorship, and therefore likeness is not equivalent to copyright.17
For example, in Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc.1o8 the Seventh Circuit
found that copyright did not preempt a model's claim for violation of
her publicity right when the basis for the model's claim was that the
company using her likeness was using it to send an unauthorized
message-i.e., that the model endorsed certain products.109
Alternatively, copyright and the publicity right can be construed as
equivalent. A person should not be able use the state law publicity
right to prevent the exercise of an otherwise valid copyright.11o Nor
should the publicity right be used as an end-run around an otherwise
103 Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 4o6 F.3d 905, 91o (7th Cir. 2005).
104 Id.
10 5 Id. ("The fact that Toney consented to the use of her photograph originally does not
change this analysis. The defendants did not have her consent to continue to use the
photograph, and therefore, they stripped Toney of her right to control the commercial
value of her identity.")
I6 Id.; see also Apigram Publ'g Co. v. Factors Etc., Inc., No. C 78-525, 1980 WL 2047, at 4-
5 (N.D. Ohio July 30, 198o) (finding that "the common law right of publicity is not
equivalent to the rights protected by federal copyright law. A cause of action based on the
right of publicity involves elements, such as the invasion of personal privacy rights, which
are not present in the law of copyright.").
107 KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 78 Cal. App. 4th 362, 374 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 2000)
(quoting Melville B. Nimmer, 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.oi[B][1][c] (rev. ed. 1996)).
108 Toney, 406 F.3d 905.
.
09 Id. at 910.
110 Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1911, 1923 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1996) ("A party who
does not hold the copyright in a performance captured on film cannot prevent the one who
does from exploiting it by resort to state law.") ("The players could not prevent the clubs
from exploiting the works by asserting a state law claim for violation of the right of
publicity.").
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valid contract or waiver of copyright.,,, Often, when an individual
seeks to enforce his or her publicity right, the basis for the claim is to
prevent copying, distribution, and performance of a work "contained
within a copyrighted medium,"112 and not for a claim for imitationl3 or
unwilling promotion.114 For example, in a recent case, The Romantics,
Inc. v. Activision Publishing, Inc., a musical group alleged violation of
their publicity right for the use of one of their songs in the video game
Guitar Hero.115 Using a valid license from the song's copyright holder,
the defendants had synchronized the Romantics song to video game
graphics so that players could play a guitar in the band.16 The court
held that the plaintiffs' right of publicity claim arose from an
arrangement of a musical work that allegedly sounded similar to the
"sound recording released by The Romantics in 1980, as distinct from
the sound of any individual's voice or musical performance existing
separate and apart from a copyrighted work."117 In other words, the
plaintiffs' publicity rights claim was an attempt to control the sale,
distribution, and copying of a copyrighted sound recording; it was not
an attempt to stop an imitator or prevent unwilling promotion using
their likenesses.1 8 In situations such as the Romantics case, where
ill Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 679 (7th
Cir. 1986) ("In this litigation, the Players have attempted to obtain ex post what they did
not negotiate ex ante. That is to say, they seek a judicial declaration that they possess a
right-the right to control the telecasts of major league baseball games-that they could not
procure in bargaining with the Clubs. The Players' aim is to share in the increasingly
lucrative revenues derived from the sale of television rights for over-the-air broadcasts by
local stations and national networks and for distribution by subscription and pay cable
services. Contrary to the Players' contention, the effect of this decision is not to grant the
Clubs perpetual rights to the Players' performances. The Players remain free to attain their
objective by bargaining with the Clubs for a contractual declaration that the Players own a
joint or an exclusive interest in the copyright of the telecasts.").
112 Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2006).
113 E.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
' 
4 Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1003 (9th Cir. 2001).
11s The Romantics, Inc. v. Activision Publ'g, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889 (E.D. Mich.
2008); Guitar Hero - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GuitarHero_(series) (last visited April 8, 2010).
116 Romantics, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
117 Id. at 889.
118 Id.; See also Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2006) ("It is
clear that federal copyright law preempts a claim alleging misappropriation of one's voice
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plaintiffs are not complaining about misuse of their likeness, but
rather the use of their likenesses in a valid exercise of copyright,
courts will preempt those publicity claims. The additional element of
'commercial use' in such cases is not transformative enough to
distinguish a right of publicity claim from a copyright claim."9
Without this transformative element, certain state law publicity right
claims are preempted by federal copyright law.
2. Is THE PUBLICITY RIGHT WITHIN THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF COPYRIGHT?
The argument that the publicity right is outside the subject matter
of copyrightl °2 (and therefore not preempted) is as follows. Violation
of the right of publicity "may sometimes occur by acts of reproduction,
distribution, performance, or display, but inasmuch as the essence of
the tort does not lie in such acts, pre-emption should not apply."121
The essence of the tort is the protection of a person's likeness from
commercial misappropriation, and "[a] person's name or likeness is
not a work of authorship ... [even if] embodied in a copyrightable
[work]."122 A persona or likeness, even if so embodied, cannot be
copyrighted under current law; therefore, there is no overlap between
the publicity right and the subject matter of copyright that warrants
when the entirety of the allegedly misappropriated vocal performance is contained within a
copyrighted medium."); KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 78 Cal. App. 4th 362, 373 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2d 2000) (quoting Melville B. Nimmer, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.ol[B][1] (rev. ed.
1996)) ("A right is equivalent to rights within the exclusive province of copyright when it is
infringed by the mere act of reproducing, performing, distributing, or displaying the work
at issue. A claim asserted to prevent nothing more than the reproduction, performance,
distribution, or display of a dramatic performance captured on film is subsumed by
copyright law and preempted.").
119 Laws, 448 F.3d at 1144-45.
120 As noted above, there are eight types of work that come within the subject matter of
copyright: "literary works; musical works, including any accompanying words; dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; pantomimes and choreographic works;
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
sound recordings; and architectural works." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (LexisNexis 2009)
(punctuation changed). In addition, compilations and derivative works are within the
subject matter of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (LexisNexis 2009).
121KNB, 78 Cal. App. 4 th at 374 (emphasis added).
122 Downing, 265 F.3d at 1004-1005.
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preemption.123 Only if the publicity right is used to extend copyright-
like protection to works in the public domain or punish works that
exercise fair use, should preemption be guaranteed.1-4 Otherwise, the
elements of the right to likeness are so "different in kind" from
copyright claims that preemption is rarely appropriate.125
What courts often fail to see is that the subject matter of the
publicity right is not a specific work of art; rather the publicity right
protects identity or persona. "To argue that the photograph is
identical with the person is to confuse illusion and illustration with
reality."126  For example, in Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch,127 a
group of surfers claimed a violation of their publicity rights through
unauthorized use of a photograph.128 The Ninth Circuit found that,
while the photograph was within the subject of copyright, a person's
name or likeness is not a work of authorship as it is conceived in the
Copyright Act.129
It is possible that copyright and the publicity right may share a
subject matter. When there are no promotional or imitation issues in
a case, the publicity rights "action challenges control of the artistic
work itself and could hardly be more closely related to the subject
matter of the Copyright Act."130 When such objections are raised, they
are not objections to the misuse of likeness, but rather objections to
the fact that such parties do not own a copyright in their works of
123 KNB, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 374-75 ("[T]he subjects of the claims are the models'
likenesses, which are not copyrightable even though 'embodied in a copyrightable work
such as a photograph."') (citations omitted); Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007,
1027 (3d Cir. 2008) ("voice is outside the subject matter of copyright").
124 Toney, 406 F.3d at 911 ("State laws that intrude on the domain of copyright are
preempted even if the particular expression is neither copyrighted nor copyrightable. Such
a result is essential in order to preserve the extent of the public domain established by
copyright law.").
125 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 11oo (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
126 Downing, 265 F.3d at 1003 (quoting J. Thomas McCarthy, 2 Rights of Publicity &
Privacy § 11.13[C] (1st ed., 1997)).
12 7 
id.
128 id. at 999.
29 Id. at 1004-1005.
,30 Laws, 448 F.3d at 1142.
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authorship.11 Even if the claims arise out of imitation (especially in
the case of music), copyright law allows for the licensing of such
imitationi32 and state law cannot act as a bar to these licenses.
3. FIXATION AND THE PREEMPTION OF THE PUBLICITY RIGHT
Courts that find preemption of the publicity right only do so where
the likeness has been fixed in a tangible medium of expression.33 A
work is "fixed" when it is permanently embodied in a perceptible
form.34 Fixation can take the form of photographs, sound recordings,
movies, video games, etc. The fact that a persona is fixed within
another work means that a violation of a person's publicity right can
occur by the "mere act of reproducing, performing, distributing, or
displaying the work at issue."135 Therefore, a work must be fixed
before any publicity rights arising out of the work are preempted by
copyright. 136 However, some courts do not consider fixation to be
1311d. at 1144; Villa v. Brady Publ'g, No. 02 C 570, 2002 WL 1400345, at 1O (N.D. Ill. 2002)
("The fact that the mural incorporates the pseudonym is incidental; the essence of the
behavior with which Villa truly takes issue is the reproduction, distribution, and display of
his artwork without his permission. There is nothing in the allegations of Count III that
would not also implicate the rights contained in 17 U.S.C. § io6."); Romantics, 532 F. Supp.
2d at 889 ("Identity claims to the sound of the Song are essentially claims regarding the
licensing of a copyrighted work, falling squarely within the 'subject matter' of the Copyright
Act.").
132 "[S]ections o6 and 114(b) of the Copyright Act permit the owner of a copyright in a
musical composition to license others to make specified commercial uses of the
composition. This expressly allows third parties such as Defendants to make a sound-alike
recording of a song. Further, the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), expressly disallows any
recourse for such sound-alike recordings of a song." Romantics, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
133 "For a persona to fall under the scope of copyright as defined by § 102, it must be 'fixed'
in a tangible medium of expression. To be 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression a
work must be embodied in a copy 'by or under the authority of the author."' Leto v. RCA
Corp., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1OO1, ioo6 (N.D. II. 2004) (citations omitted); Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50
Cal. App. 4 th 1911, 1923 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1996) ("By virtue of being videotaped.., the
players' performances are fixed in tangible form, and any rights of publicity in their
performances that are equivalent to the rights contained in the copyright of the telecast are
preempted.").
134 17 U.S.C. § 101 (LexisNexis 2009).
135 Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1924.
16 Baltimore Orioles, Inc., 805 F.2d at 675 n. 22 ("To be 'fixed' in tangible form, a work
must be recorded 'by or under the authority of the author,' here Zacchini. Because
Zacchini did not consent to the telecast, the broadcast could not be 'fixed' for the purpose
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relevant to the preemption analysis; rather, because the basis of the
publicity right is in "personal rights of privacy" and not artistic
control, it cannot fall within the ambit of copyright preemption.137
4. PREEMPTION OF PUBLICITY RIGHT IN THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976138 leans toward
a very narrow preemption of state law rights. To begin, the Supreme
Court noted in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. that
"[t]he case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where
Congress (1) has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law
in a field of federal interest, and (2) has nonetheless decided to stand
by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between
them."139 Congress appears to have had just such an awareness of the
publicity right. As courts have noted, the legislative history of section
301(a) of the Copyright Act-the preemption statute-indicates that
Congress wished for the publicity right to remain unaffected by the
preemption provision "as long as the causes of action contain
elements, such as an invasion of personal rights" different from the
elements of copyright infringement. 14°
However, other courts maintain that Congress contemplated that
"as long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter" of
copyright, it preempts state law. Such courts argue that section 301(a)
of copyrightability and Zacchini's right of publicity would not be subject to preemption.")
(citing facts of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
It is noteworthy that fixation requires consent or authority, Leto v. RCA Corp., 341 F.
Supp. 2d OOl, 1OO6 (N.D. Il. 2004) ("Defendants have not evidenced that the
photographs were taken 'by or under the authority' of the plaintiffs and, therefore, we
cannot find that the works which plaintiffs seek to protect-their personas-are 'fixed' and
copyrightable.") (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1l), and that consent is a defense to the violation of
the publicity right.
137 Norred v. Labren Enters. and Mgmt., No. 04-269o, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36566, at *6
(E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2005).
138 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, 9o Stat. 2541 (1976).
139 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166-67 (1989) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
140 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d at 11oo (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976),
available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Index:H.R.-Rep._No._94-1476) (last visited
April 8, 2010) (emphasis added).
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of the Copyright Act "preempts all equivalent state-law rights claimed
in any work within the subject matter of copyright.141 Thus, while the
legislative history shows that Congress was aware of the publicity right
and did not wish to quash it completely, there is a clear tension
between the right to likeness and copyright. The courts will resolve
this tension via preemption when the facts presented indicate that the
plaintiff is not attempting to protect his or her likeness, but rather
attempting to exert control over the otherwise valid exercise of a
copyright.142
VI. COULD COPYRIGHT LAW PREEMPT AN
AVATAR'S PUBLICITY RIGHTS CLAIM?
This section discusses whether copyright law could preempt an
attempt to enforce a player's publicity right in his or her avatar. As
noted above, the publicity right may be preempted by federal
copyright law if the publicity right can be considered as an end-run
around an otherwise valid exercise of copyright. To a certain extent,
an avatar can be copyrighted as a character. Because the copyright
system affords no protection to ideas43 copyright does not protect
characters that are stock ideas.144 Copyright protection extends to
literary, animated, and illustrated characters in two ways: (1) when
the character is sufficiently delineated, and (2) when the character is
"the story being told."145 In other words, "[t]he less developed the
characters, the less they can be copyrighted."146 This rule is strictly
'4'Baltimore Orioles, Inc., 805 F.2d at 676 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 131 (1976)).
42 The above cases seem to indicate that as right to likeness claims move further away from
protecting one's physical likeness and toward protecting other facets of our persona - e.g.,
vocal likeness - the courts are more willing to find preemption.
43 "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (emphasis added).
'4 Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955) ("If the character is only the chessman in the
game of telling the story he is not within the area of the protection afforded by the
copyright.").
145 Id.
146 Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)).
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applied to literary characters, and less so to animated and illustrated
characters because "literary characters are difficult to delineate and
may be based on nothing more than an unprotected idea"; however,
cartoon characters are distinguishable from literary characters in that
they have physical as well as conceptual qualities, and are "more likely
to contain some unique elements of expression."147 Characters who
are sufficiently delineated, and thus protectable under the copyright
regime, display "consistent, widely identifiable traits."148 With respect
to preemption of the publicity right, if a person portrays a character,
he or she has no publicity right in that character because the publicity
right protects only our own personas, not those personas we adopt.149
In many fantasy games such as World of Warcraft, characters are
limited to variations of stock elements. While the stock elements are
numerous, there are still a limited number of combinations to the way
a troll hunter or elf warrior may look. While players have numerous
customization options, ultimately they are still playing as archetypal
characters. While psychology research certainly implies that players
create characters to resemble themselves,15 archetypal characters
made up of stock elements make a weak case for copyright. Any
copyright in the individual elements that make up the character
belong to the game maker. Because these fantasy characters present a
weak case for copyright, preemption is not likely to be an issue.
Nevertheless, because these characters do not bear a resemblance to
their players, it is difficult to say that any likeness of the player exists
in the character.
Avatars, on the other hand, can (or will in the future) bear a strong
resemblance to their players. As the avatar takes on more individual
qualities, it becomes more specifically delineated'5 in that it becomes
147 Halicki Films, LLC v. Sanderson Sales & Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213, 1224 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
148 Id.
149 See Stanford v. Caesars Entm't, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 749, 756-57 (W.D. Tenn. 2006)
(citations omitted) (holding that plaintiff could not claim publicity right over dramatic
portrayal of fictional character).
150 Bessiere et al., supra note 57, at 531.
151 For most games, the characters and avatars are not "the story being told." While
characters and avatars are certainly participants in an epic story or society, there is no
story being told in MMORPGs. Rather, each player is given the choice as to how he or she




uniquely identifiable from other avatars. When such a strong
resemblance becomes possible, there is a stronger case that the avatar
is copyrightable as a character. Under current MMORPG TOS and
EULAs, the game makers hold copyright in all avatars. In such cases,
a claim for a violation of publicity rights against a game maker
resembles cases such as Toney v. L'Oreal USA, Inc.152- i.e., an
individual alleges misuse of his or her likeness in a copyrighted work
against the copyright holder. At this point, the jurisdiction's
precedent in such cases will be a deciding factor as to whether any
publicity rights held by the player are preempted by copyright law. It
is ironic that as a player's publicity rights become stronger- as player
begins to resemble his or her avatar- so to do the gamemaker's
copyright interests in the avatar.
However, a second possibility is that as avatars approach
photorealism, they may no longer be subject to copyright. Copyright,
after all, rewards a creative act. As avatar graphics approach reality,
they are no longer products of the game maker's creative act; rather,
they are the works of the players themselves who either upload their
likenesses or construct it through the program. 153 When this type of
realism is possible, the game maker's copyright over avatars can be
seriously questioned, and players can make strong publicity rights
claims to prevent commercial use of their avatars.154
15217 U.S.C. §1o (LexisNexis 2009); Toney, 406 F.3d at 91o.
153 At this point, avatar creation will only be facilitated by the game software-i.e., as
avatars become more customizable, they are no longer made up of stock parts, each of
which is copyrighted by the game makers. Rather, avatars will be a series of precise
decisions regarding skin tone, nose angle, hair cut, etc., made entirely by the player.
154 Until this time, other legal remedies may be available to players in the form of federal
regulations of deceptive practices. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
prohibits, inter alia, "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2009). An act or practice is deceptive if (1) there is a
representation, omission, or practice that (2) is likely to mislead consumers acting
reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) the representation, omission, or practice is
material; deception may be "based on the 'net impression' created by a representation."
FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (finding
defendants' advertising was deceptive in that it led consumers to believe that they could
make $1o,ooo per month while working five to ten hours per week); FTC v. Peoples Credit
First, LLC, 244 Fed. Appx. 942, 944 (iith Cir. 2007). Section 5 does not create a private
right of action; it is only enforceable by the FTC. Helms v. ConsumerInfo.com, Inc., 436 F.
Supp. 2d 1220, 1235 n.19 (D. Ala. 2005) (citations omitted).
Under section 5, courts have found that software that invades a computer without
providing benefit is a deceptive practice. FTC v. Seismic Entm't Prods., No. 04-377-JD,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788, at *8-12 (D.N.H. Oct. 21, 2004). The Act likely gives the
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VII. CONCLUSION
In laying out the background of the current state of law
surrounding the publicity right and its interaction with copyright law,
this note seeks to divine the future of the tort as it relates to online
privacy in MMORPGs. In such games, most people play characters
and not themselves. However, with games such as Second Life and
The Sims Online, there is a clear movement towards games in which
players can play as themselves. Industry standards currently demand
a waiver of the right to a player's likeness in characters before playing
the game. Given the ease with which intimately personal information
is collected online and the targeted advertising that the internet
specializes in, the waiver of the right to publicity is worrisome. This is
one of many concerns in the arena of online privacy. It has not yet
manifested as a problem, but gaming technology, just as social
networking, is quickly outpacing the law. This is certain to become a
problem. Currently, the virtual communities in which players extend
their virtual selves are almost exclusively for gaming. However, it is
not difficult to imagine opening virtual universities and virtual offices
using the platforms similar to MMORPGs. As the lines between the
virtual self and actual self begin to blur, the private ownership of the
virtual world will certainly implicate individual privacy rights.
FTC the power to regulate contracts of adhesion and contracts with unconscionable terms
under section 5. See American Financial Services Asso. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 982-983
(D.C. Cir. 1985). As of July 2009, no case has applied section 5 of the FTC Act to contracts
similar to those addressed in this note, such as terms of service or end-user license
agreements. However, the argument for applying section 5 to commercial use of an
avatar's likeness would likely be as follows: players play games expecting their game
licenses to extend to them reasonable control over their characters as they progress in the
virtual world. That the game maker might use a person's avatar for commercial advantage
seems to be well outside the scope of what is expected by most players who are deeply
attached to their avatars and characters. Any wide-scale, commercial abuse of avatar
likeness is deceptive given (1) the players' personal relationships to their avatars, (2) the
openness of the virtual world created by the game makers, and (3) the fact that players
assume that when an avatar speaks, it is speaking for the player, and not the game makers.
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